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Introduction 
 
India’s defense strategy toward Southeast Asia can be understood in terms of two broad 
sets of strategic objectives that together drive India’s relationships in the region. These 
include its ambitions to be the predominant power in the northeast Indian Ocean and 
a broader objective to assume a greater strategic role in Southeast Asia and the Paciﬁc. 
India’s aspirations to increase its defense presence in the region are broadly consistent 
with the perspectives of many ASEAN states, which mostly see India as a positive 
factor in the Southeast Asian balance of power. But India is yet to demonstrate itself 
as a useful and consistent security partner for much of the region. India is hindered 
by a lack of strategic focus and planning that is consistent with many of its strategic 
relationships. 
New Delhi sees several strategic imperatives to be the predominant power in the 
northeast Indian Ocean, which includes the huge bay comprised of the Bay of Bengal 
and Andaman Sea. For India, the northeast represents a key defensive space against 
potential threats that may emanate from or through the Southeast Asian archipelago. 
The ability to control the sea lines of communication that cross the Bay of Bengal and 
Andaman Sea and enter the Paciﬁc Ocean through the Malacca Strait would also pro-
vide India with considerable strategic leverage in dealing with rival powers. The area 
also has numerous immediate security issues that may either directly threaten India’s 
interests or otherwise require it to act as a regional maritime security provider, includ-
ing piracy and smuggling, maritime terrorism, the activities of separatist movements in 
Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, and India, and territorial disputes over offshore energy 
resources. 
India’s second set of strategic objectives in Southeast Asia stems from its desire to 
expand its strategic role in Southeast Asia and further into the Paciﬁc. India is driven 
by an imperative to balance China’s growing inﬂuence in Southeast Asia as well as its 
aspirations to expand its own strategic space. India has been relatively successful in 
recent years in expanding its inﬂuence in Southeast Asia in a cooperative and relatively 
benign manner. It has little choice but to proceed in that way. India’s lack of strength 
compared with other major powers, particularly China, means it must remain ﬂexible 
and discreet in its engagement with Southeast Asia with the expectation that its relative 
power will grow in coming decades. 
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Despite these imperatives, India does not yet have a clearly articulated strategy for 
its defense engagement with Southeast Asia. New Delhi has made it clear that closer 
defense relations with Southeast Asia is a key part of its Look East policy through 
which India has sought to develop a comprehensive economic, political, and security 
relationship with the region. At a diplomatic level, India has engaged in regional secu-
rity groupings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue and the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers + 8 meetings, as well as establishing regular bilateral dia-
logues at Defense Minister level with key states such as Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. New Delhi has frequently allowed the Indian Navy to lead the 
way in building military-to-military relationships. This has involved developing a naval 
presence where it could through regular exercises, coordinated patrols and ship visits. 
The Indian Navy has also sought to emphasize its role as a leading provider of public 
goods to the region, including in areas such as piracy, smuggling, maritime terrorism, 
and humanitarian and disaster relief. Through these means, India is seeking its gradual 
acceptance over time as a benign power and a preferred security partner to ASEAN, if 
one having a somewhat undeﬁned role. 
Although India is a strong supporter of ASEAN as a regional organization, the lack 
of a regional defense policy among ASEAN states means that most engagement takes 
place at a bilateral level. India’s initial focus in expanding its inﬂuence into Southeast 
Asia has been on Singapore, which historically recognized India as being a natural secu-
rity provider to the region. India has also had a political alliance with Vietnam stemming 
from the Cold War era, but which has been revived in recent years. But India will 
need to make considerable investments of resources and political will to develop other 
partners in the region, some of which have been more hesitant in recognizing India’s 
regional security role. 
 
 
 
India’s Leading Maritime Security Role in the Northeast Indian Ocean 
 
The starting point in any discussion of India’s defense strategy in Southeast Asia is 
India’s leading maritime security role in the northeast Indian Ocean. Key ASEAN 
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Myanmar lie on or near 
these waters. India’s role in this area is a function of its geographic advantages, its 
relative capabilities and its perceived strategic imperatives. India has dominated the 
northeast Indian Ocean since at least 1971, when the separation of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan removed any challenge to its position from any potential rival. India’s suc-
cessful naval blockade of Bangladesh severely inhibited Pakistan’s ability to defend the 
territory and was an important reminder of the strategic consequences of control over 
the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea. 
In recent years, India has been reinforcing its capabilities in the northeast Indian 
Ocean. Much of India’s naval modernization program over the last decade has focused 
on improving its capabilities in the northeast. There has been an effective “rebalanc-
ing” of the proportion of defense resources committed to the India’s eastern waters, 
reﬂecting relatively reduced conventional maritime threat perceptions in relation to 
Pakistan and relatively increased threat perceptions in relation to China. This rebal-
ancing includes the planned construction of a major new base for the Eastern Fleet 
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south of Visakhapatnam on India’s east coast, with capacity for two aircraft carriers and 
nuclear submarines, among other things. According to Lawrence Prabhakar, an Indian 
naval analyst, the proposed base will have “comprehensive anti-air, anti-submarine and 
amphibious capability, meaning a greater allocation of priority to the emergent Chinese 
naval force posture in the Myanmar region.”1 
India dominant strategic position in the northeast Indian Ocean is underpinned by 
its possession of the Andaman and Nicobar islands, which run north-south through 
the Andaman Sea near the western end of the Malacca Strait. As K. M. Panikkar once 
commented, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands potentially give India strategic bases 
“which if fully utilised in coordination with air power can convert the Bay of Bengal 
into a secure area.”2 These islands also form a natural base for India to project power 
into the Malacca Strait and beyond into the South China Sea. They also have the poten-
tial to dominate the Malacca Strait and have been described by a Chinese naval writer as 
constituting a “metal chain” that could lock the western end of the Malacca Strait tight.3 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, India developed extensive military facilities in the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, including port facilities to service elements of the 
Eastern Fleet and air bases for surveillance and strike aircraft. The operational radius 
of aircraft based in, or staging through, the Andamans encompasses the Malacca Strait 
and large portions of the South China Sea.4 Under a plan announced in 2010, there will 
be a major development of military infrastructure, including runway upgrades and the 
development of port infrastructure for use by major vessels. In addition, there will be 
a permanent deployment of UAVs and an expansion of the 3,500-strong army brigade 
to divisional strength.5 In July 2012, the Indian Navy opened a new forward air base 
on Great Nicobar, at the northern end of the Malacca Strait, which will be used primar-
ily for maritime surveillance. However, the Indian Air Force has not yet permanently 
deployed frontline strike aircraft in the islands. 
As previously noted, over the last two decades, the Indian Navy has played a lead-
ing role in developing cooperative security relationships with several ASEAN states 
bordering the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea, including through conducting joint naval 
patrols, bilateral exercises, and hosting the biennial MILAN “gathering” of regional 
navies at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. The absence of the United States and 
China from the MILAN meetings is a none-too-subtle reminder of India’s assertion of 
regional leadership. As the same time, the Indian Navy has made considerable efforts to 
prove itself the leading provider of public goods to the region, providing maritime secu-
rity in areas such as piracy, smuggling, refugees, terrorism and separatism. The Indian 
Navy has also demonstrated its capabilities to provide humanitarian assistance and dis-
aster relief to several ASEAN states, including following the 2004 Tsunami, which 
affected much of the northeast Indian Ocean, the 2007 Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, 
and 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. All of these initiatives help legitimize India’s 
naval presence in the region. 
 
 
Myanmar and a Chinese Presence in the Northeast Indian Ocean 
 
Over the last two decades, the only potential threat to India’s leading position in 
the northeast Indian Ocean has come through Myanmar. Some see Myanmar as an 
essentially “contested space” in which India and China vie for it as a strategic “prize.” 
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But it is probably more accurate to see Myanmar as a buffer state—that is, although 
it may lean one way or another, it is unlikely to allow itself to be permanently incor-
porated into any sphere of inﬂuence. While Myanmar has tilted toward China, the 
political reforms that have occurred there over the last year or so seem to signal that it 
will take a more balanced approach in future years. 
The most immediate security issue between India and Myanmar is the ethnic-based 
separatist insurgencies in India’s Northeast States and western Myanmar. Many sep-
aratist groups live on both sides of the border and both India and Myanmar have in 
the past attempted to use these insurgencies as strategic leverage against the other, from 
time to time supporting or condoning insurgencies in the other’s territory. Since the 
1990s there has been intermittent and largely ineffective cooperation between India and 
Myanmar in cross-border counterinsurgency operations. Over this period, and par-
ticularly since 2006, India provided intelligence and limited training and equipment 
to Myanmar intended to either bolster the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency capabili-
ties or was given as quid pro quo for taking on insurgent groups. But elements of the 
Tatmadaw are suspected, among other things, of having signiﬁcant commercial interests 
in the smuggling activities undertaken by Indian separatist groups and are particu-
larly reluctant to interrupt that trade, and as a result India has little to show for its 
efforts. The failure of both India and Myanmar to take effective action against sepa-
ratist insurgents sheltering in their territories continues to be a signiﬁcant irritant in the 
relationship. 
But India’s principal long-term strategic concern with Myanmar stems from the 
extent of China’s strategic inﬂuence there. The international isolation of Myanmar after 
the military junta took power in 1988 led it to turn to China as an international partner, 
and many analysts were concerned that this might involve the development of a Chinese 
strategic presence in the Northeast Indian Ocean. There were many claims that China 
was involved in the upgrading of several commercial ports or naval facilities, as well as 
the establishment of a signals intelligence facility on Great Coco Island. Although the 
Indian Navy has conceded that there is no Chinese intelligence facility or any Chinese 
naval bases anywhere in Myanmar, the issue remains a matter of signiﬁcant concern for 
some in the Indian security community.6 
The recent reforms by the Myanmar government under President Thein Sein appear 
to signal an important strategic shift by Myanmar, opening its relationship with the 
United States and India while distancing itself from China, making the potential for 
a Chinese security presence in the northeast Indian Ocean much less likely. Myanmar 
could well revert to an isolationist “prickly” neutralism that characterized the ﬁrst four 
decades after independence, although the current signs are that it will move closer to 
the ASEAN economic and political model. However, either result will likely mitigate or 
remove a potential challenge to India’s predominant strategic position in the northeast 
Indian Ocean. 
 
 
 
India’s Maritime Security Ambitions in the Malacca Strait 
 
A focal point of India’s maritime security ambitions in the northeast Indian Ocean is 
its ambitions in the Malacca Strait, which is identiﬁed by the Indian Navy as part of 
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its “primary area of interest.”7 The Malacca Strait is the primary route for sea trafﬁc 
between the Indian and Paciﬁc Oceans and one of the world’s busiest waterways, 
including a projected 140,000 ship movements per annum by 2020. Around one third of 
global trade and the bulk of energy supplies from the Middle East to East Asia transit 
it. An ability to exert negative control over the Strait would be signiﬁcant for India’s 
strategic role in Southeast Asia, and indeed the entire Indian Ocean. Some claim that 
for India the Strait represents a rough counterpart to the strategic importance of the 
Panama Canal to the United States.8 Kaplan describes the Strait as being as strategically 
signiﬁcant in coming decades as was the Fulda Gap during the Cold War.9 
The ability to exert control over the Strait has both defensive and offensive impli-
cations for India. A role in Strait security is an important element in India’s ability to 
protect its sea lines of communication into the Paciﬁc Ocean. But negative control over 
the Strait could also provide India with considerable strategic leverage in any potential 
conﬂict. The Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine argues that, “Control of the choke 
points could be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the 
currency of military power remains a stark reality.”10 The Indian Ocean is the one area 
in which India holds a clear military advantage over China and the potential to con-
trol the Malacca Strait reinforces that advantage. As former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, 
Admiral Mehta, commented, “The weak area for China today is the Indian Navy. We sit 
in the Indian Ocean and that is a concern for China and they are not happy as it is not 
so easy for them to come inside.”11 John Garver, an expert on Sino-Indian relations, 
comments: “. . . in the event of a PRC-ROI conﬂict, India might be tempted to escalate 
from the land dimension, where India might suffer reverses, to the maritime dimension, 
where it enjoys substantial advantages, and employ those advantages to restrict China’s 
vital Indian Ocean trade.”12 
As noted previously, India’s defense facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
provide it with considerable measure of potential control over the western approaches 
to the Malacca Strait. Over the last decade India has also sought to develop an active 
security role—either direct or indirect—inside the Strait. At the turn of this century 
there were considerable concerns about piracy and the potential for maritime ter-
rorists to block use of the Strait. In 2002, following an unsolicited request from the 
United States, India provided naval escorts for high-value commercial trafﬁc through 
the Strait as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. India’s participation in 
the operation was supported by Singapore (which hosted Indian naval vessels), and 
India is believed to have consulted Malaysia and Indonesia as well as the Philippines and 
Australia on the initiative. As the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Pace, commented in 2006, the United States was “very comfortable with the fact that 
India has offered its assistance” in providing security in the Strait.13 
In the early years of this century there was controversy over moves by the United 
States and others to take a role in providing maritime security in the Strait. This 
included the Regional Maritime Security Initiative under which the United States pro-
posed to provide security in the Malacca Strait in partnership with littoral states, which 
was strongly opposed by Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia have also 
refused to formally participate in the Japanese-sponsored multilateral ReCAAP ini-
tiative involving the voluntary exchange of information on piracy and other security 
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threats in the Strait. India also positioned itself as a potential benign security provider 
in the Strait. According to one Indian naval ofﬁcer, “Our role [in the Malacca Strait] is 
being perceived as that of a responsible nation, which can create a balance in the region. 
Also, everyone realizes that India has no ambitions of hegemony.”14 India has insisted 
that any security initiatives in the Strait must be subject to the unanimous consent of 
littoral states, while at the same time lobbying littoral states for an active role in the 
Strait both at the political and military level.15 
While Singapore has generally encouraged an Indian security role, Indonesia has 
been somewhat ambivalent, while Malaysia has opposed it. In June 2007 Indonesian 
Defense Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, deﬂected requests from the Indian Defense 
Minister for a role in patrolling the Strait.16 But a 2009 meeting of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in Jakarta produced an invitation to Thailand to join with Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore in coordinated patrols of the Strait17 and an Indonesian mil-
itary spokesman reportedly requested India to take part in maintaining security in 
the Malacca Strait, on the basis that “all approaches to the strait will be more secure 
for international shipping.”18 In 2010, the Indonesian Defense Minister, Purnomo 
Yusgiantoro, was reported as commenting that Indonesia had “no reservations at all” 
about India maintaining security in the Malacca Strait.19 In contrast, Malaysia has 
generally been opposed to allowing an Indian security role in the Strait. However, 
Malaysia’s very cautious views toward India’s naval presence in the area may have 
softened a little in recent years.20 
Most ASEAN states now see India’s defense presence in the northeast Indian Ocean 
in relatively benign terms and regard India as a net security provider. This contrasts 
with a degree of unease felt in the region during the 1980s about India’s ambitious 
naval modernization plans and what was seen to be its opaque intentions. Regional 
perspectives about India also contrast sharply with perspectives on China’s naval build 
up in the South China Sea, which is now seen as a major destabilizing factor in the 
region. But India’s ambitions in the Malacca Strait are seen somewhat differently from 
its presence in the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea and there seems little prospect at the 
moment that all the littoral states will agree to giving India a direct security role in the 
Strait. Among other things, there are few immediate security threats (such as piracy 
and maritime terrorism) to be addressed and any Indian naval presence in the Strait 
would likely be regarded as highly provocative by China. But if the security environ-
ment changes and littoral states come under increased pressure to take action on Strait 
security they may allow India to participate in Strait security on their terms. Any secu-
rity role for India would be a signiﬁcant, not only with respect to the Malacca Strait, 
but also in legitimizing India’s claims to be a benign security provider to the region as 
a whole. 
 
 
 
India’s Defense Engagement With Southeast Asia 
 
India’s second set of strategic objectives in Southeast Asia relate to its broader ambi-
tions to expand its political and security role in the region. India is driven not only by 
an imperative to balance China’s growing inﬂuence in Southeast Asia but also by its 
aspirations to expand its own strategic space into the region as part of its own growing 
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economic and military power. Several Southeast Asian states are encouraging India to 
play a greater role in the region as a useful balance to China. 
Although India has close historical links with Southeast Asia, its inward turn fol-
lowing Independence severely undermined its inﬂuence in the region which means that 
India is still making up for much lost ground. Although some in Southeast Asia in the 
1960s saw India as a natural strategic partner and a potential security guarantor, consis-
tent with its principles of nonalignment, India refused to participate in any proposed 
regional security arrangements. During the latter years of the Cold War, India’s rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union, and its support for the Soviet Union’s ally, Vietnam, 
reinforced India’s political estrangement from the region and was a source of consid-
erable political irritation. It is only in the last two decades that India has really sought 
to comprehensively engage with Southeast Asia. In the depths of India’s post-Cold 
War economic and political crisis in 1992, the Rao government launched the “Look 
East Policy” which was designed to expand economic, political and security ties with 
Southeast Asia. India’s most immediate motivation was the need to expand trade and 
investment links with Southeast Asia in the face of a major economic crisis. 
At the political level, India’s current policy is to promote the “centrality” of 
ASEAN in the region, which has caused it to focus on developing links with ASEAN-
based organizations. India became a full dialogue partner to ASEAN in 1995 and 
an annual India-ASEAN summit has been held since 2002. India has also spon-
sored new subregional organizations in the northeast Indian Ocean, including the 
BIMSTEC grouping21 to promote technical and economic cooperation among states in 
the Bay of Bengal (including Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar), and the Mekong Ganga 
Cooperation group, to promote greater east-west transport connectivity between South 
Asia and Indochina. India’s reliance on ASEAN in extending its inﬂuence into the 
region also means that it is an important supporter of ASEAN’s role as the organi-
zational focus of various Asia Paciﬁc groupings.22 But a signiﬁcant reduction in the 
relevance of ASEAN-centered institutions could ultimately lead India to opt to tran-
scend existing regional organizations and deal directly with other major powers of the 
Asia Paciﬁc.23 
India has also been a strong supporter of ASEAN-centered security arrangements. 
India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and effectively acceded to two 
ASEAN-sponsored security treaties: the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (through 
announcing that it would abide by the Treaty Protocol—as a non-NPT state it could 
not formally accede to it) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (formally acced-
ing in 2003). India also participates in the meetings of Defense Ministers of ASEAN 
plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United 
States (known as ADMM + 8). But despite India’s support for ASEAN institutions, 
ASEAN has only a limited role in regional security and is unlikely to assume a more 
signiﬁcant role any time soon. This means that for the foreseeable future security 
engagement will largely occur at the bilateral level. 
The majority of ASEAN states have, to a greater or lesser degree, welcomed an 
increased regional role for India, including in maritime security. Many now see India 
as potentially playing an important role in the regional balance of power through 
helping to ensure a balanced distribution of power in the region, alongside other key 
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extra-regional powers such as the United States, China, Japan and Australia. Singapore, 
in particular, has consistently welcomed and encouraged a balanced role for external 
security providers on the basis that competition between major regional powers “must 
be squarely confronted and cannot be wished away.”24 Singapore’s conception of a 
“balance of power” involves a multipolar balance that provides freedom to smaller 
states. As the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has argued, Singapore’s concept of a 
balance of power “depends on the competing interests of several big powers in the 
region, rather than on linking the nation’s fortunes to one overbearing power. The 
big powers can keep one another in check, and will prevent any one of them from 
dominating the entire region, and so allow small states to survive in the interstices 
between them.”25 However, aside from Singapore, a broad consensus on the impor-
tance of India’s engagement in the region as a balance to China has not yet translated 
into close defense relationships. 
The United States is also encouraging India to assume a greater role in the Southeast 
Asian balance of power, including through developing its defense relationships with 
U.S. allies and friends in the region. Washington is also actively promoting the idea of 
the “Indo-Paciﬁc” as a single security region, which justiﬁes India playing a greater 
political and defense role in East Asia/Paciﬁc. In the longer term this includes poten-
tially assuming a direct security role in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. 
The United States hopes that India might become an important political partner in East 
Asia, which can help bolster its efforts to temper China’s strategic ambitions. 
While there is a broad consensus among ASEAN states in favor of India playing a 
more active security role in Southeast Asia, there is no clear understanding among them 
as to what that role should be. To a signiﬁcant extent this reﬂects a systemic failure of 
strategic coordination among ASEAN states. Nor has India melded its bilateral defense 
relationships with ASEAN states into a coherent regional strategy, which to a signif-
icant extent reﬂects New Delhi’s own systemic failures in strategic planning. Rather, 
each of India’s defense relationships with ASEAN states is currently driven more by 
their own dynamics and circumstances. India has relatively good defense relationships 
only with two states, Singapore and Vietnam, while its security relations with other 
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand remain at a relatively basic level. 
As noted previously, the Indian Navy has often led the way in building military-to-
military relationships in the region, promoting regular defense dialogues and seeking 
to develop a naval presence in the region through regular exercises, coordinated patrols 
and ship visits.26 The Indian Navy also offers its capabilities to provide public goods in 
areas such as piracy, smuggling, maritime terrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, 
and hydrographic research. In most cases, India has sought to develop these rela-
tionships slowly and relatively informally, leaving India’s desired security role largely 
undeﬁned. With the partial exception of Vietnam (discussed in the following section), 
India has avoided developing a permanent military presence in the region. 
 
 
 
India’s Key Bilateral Defense Relationships in Southeast Asia 
Over the last two decades, Singapore has positioned itself as the hub of India’s eco-
nomic, political and strategic relationships in Southeast Asia.27 When India announced 
 
India’s Defense Strategy Toward Southeast Asia 159 
 
its Look East policy in 1992, Singapore responded with enthusiasm and quickly posi-
tioned itself as India’s de facto regional sponsor. Singapore now unquestionably plays a 
pivotal role in India’s ambitions: it is India’s regional advocate, its economic and polit-
ical gateway into Southeast Asia and its most enthusiastic security partner. As Indian 
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee commented in 2006, Singapore has become “the 
hub of its political, economic and security strategy in the whole of East Asia.”28 
Singapore has made several attempts to draw India into a security role in Southeast 
Asia. In what was probably his ﬁrst act as leader of an independent Singapore in August 
1965, Lee Kwan Yew requested Indian assistance in training the newly established 
Singaporean army, to which New Delhi did not respond. Singapore’s wish to facili-
tate an Indian security role in the region was revived after the end of the Cold War. 
As K. Kesavapany, a former senior Singaporean diplomat, put it: “India has de facto 
inherited the British security role” stretching from Aden to Singapore.29 
Over the last decade or so, the Indian and Singapore Armed Forces have developed a 
relatively close relationship. In 2003, India and Singapore entered into a comprehensive 
defense cooperation agreement that has facilitated annual defense policy dialogues, joint 
exercises, intelligence sharing and cooperation in defense technology. The Singapore 
and Indian navies exercise together frequently, mostly in the Bay of Bengal but also 
in the South China Sea. Indian naval vessels are also regular visitors to Changi Naval 
Base.30 The army and air forces have conducted annual exercises since 2004. The 
Singapore Air Force has long-term use of the Indian Kalaikunda air base and India has 
agreed to the stationing of Singaporean army personnel and equipment at its Babina and 
Deololli ﬁring ranges. While the use of foreign facilities is nothing new for Singapore, 
the use of Indian territory by foreign defense forces represents a major policy shift for 
India which since Independence ﬁercely opposed any foreign military bases anywhere 
in Asia. 
From India’s perspective, Singapore’s size, economic role and geographic posi-
tion makes it an almost ideal partner for extending its inﬂuence in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore’s clear-sighted approach to its own needs and the perceived needs of the 
region allows the relationship with India to develop without the historical or ideolog-
ical baggage that could be a factor in some of India’s other relationships. In strategic 
terms, access to Singapore’s port and air facilities, in combination with India’s bases 
in the Andaman Islands, reinforces India’s position in the Malacca Strait and in the 
longer term could even be used to project power into the South China Sea. There are, 
however, some important limitations to the relationship. Singapore has close and long-
standing defense relationships with others, particularly the United States and Australia. 
For India, Singapore’s small size and its omnidirectional foreign policy means that India 
must develop stronger economic, political and security relationships with larger states 
if it wishes to have a major strategic role in the region. 
India’s other key defense relationship in Southeast Asia is with Vietnam. For more 
than forty years, India has stood with Vietnam, its “most trusted friend and ally,”31 
in resisting external domination. In recent years, India has been seeking—with only 
limited success—to develop Vietnam as a key security partner. Some in New Delhi see 
an “alliance” with Vietnam, essentially aimed at China, as a quid pro quo for China’s 
alliance with Pakistan. According to Bharat Karnad, a noted Indian nuclear strategist, 
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“by cultivating a resolute Vietnam as a close regional ally and security partner in the 
manner China has done Pakistan, India can pay Beijing back in the same coin.”32 
However, while Vietnam wants to develop India as political and economic balance to 
China, India is yet to prove itself as a credible a security partner to Vietnam.33 
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant steps in developing a defense relationship with Vietnam were 
taken in 2000 with the formalization of a wide-ranging defense cooperation agreement. 
This provided for regular exchange of intelligence, joint coastguard training to com-
bat piracy, jungle warfare and counterinsurgency training for the Indian army, repair of 
Vietnamese MiG aircraft, training of Vietnamese pilots and Indian assistance on small 
and medium arms production. But in the following years, India turned out to be a less 
than reliable weapons supplier. While Vietnam was initially keen on sourcing spares 
for Soviet-vintage equipment from India, the Indians found themselves undercut by 
cheap competitors and other deals have been lost through payment-related problems 
and Indian bureaucratic bottlenecks. There was also considerable political caution on 
the part of India, particularly in relation to the supply of advanced missile technology. 
Vietnam has formally requested the supply of Indian Prithvi intermediate range ballis-
tic missiles and BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles.34 India’s Russian partners, however, 
blocked the supply of BrahMos missiles. Additionally, although the Indians report-
edly agreed “in principle” to the sale of Prithvi missiles, this has subsequently stalled.35 
However, Indian defense is well placed to provide training and maintenance services in 
relation to Russian-sourced equipment such as Vietnam’s new Sukhoi aircraft and Kilo 
class submarines. 
The key to the India-Vietnam defense relationship is the potential for an Indian 
naval role in the South China Sea. Indian strategists have long recognized the strategic 
importance of the South China Sea.36 An Indian naval presence there would allow it to 
respond to China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and signal an expansion of 
India’s area of strategic interest. Vietnam sees an Indian security presence as giving it 
the support of another major power in its disputes with China. Vietnam has encouraged 
India to effectively take a stake in the South China Sea dispute through the Indian 
state-owned oil company, ONGC, acquiring oil exploration permits in waters claimed 
by Vietnam to be within its EEZ, but which are also claimed by China. But both are 
also keen to avoid actions that might be overly provocative to China. As a result, India 
and Vietnam have conducted a dance for more than a decade, each running hot and cold 
over a possible Indian naval presence in the South China Sea. 
In June 2011, Vietnam announced that the India Navy would be given regular access 
to the small port of Nha Trang, which is very close to the large naval base at Cam Ranh 
Bay. According to an Indian ofﬁcial, the Indian Navy would create what he called a 
“sustainable presence” presence in the South China Sea.37 But for India, there are limits 
to even a symbolic presence. In July 2012, the retiring Indian Naval Chief of Staff, 
Admiral Verma, commented that any active deployment of the Indian Navy to the 
Paciﬁc and South China Sea “is not on the cards.”38 It may be that a tacit understanding 
will be reached between China and India not to trespass on each other’s “patch”— 
China would refrain from developing a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
while India refrained from developing a presence in the South China Sea. All in all, 
it seems unlikely that India will never be more than a secondary security partner to 
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Vietnam. India’s power projection capabilities are limited and it has not demonstrated 
its reliability and commitment to the security relationship. 
India has been slower to develop security relationships with larger states in 
archipelagic Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. While they have 
been generally tolerant of India’s strategic ambitions in the northeast Indian Ocean, 
they have been cautious about seeing an expanded security role for India beyond the 
Andaman Sea. This may inhibit the expansion of India’s security role in Southeast Asia 
unless there is a signiﬁcant change in the security environment. 
India’s relationship with Indonesia, though relatively undeveloped, may be a key 
factor to its strategic role in Southeast Asia in coming years.39 New Delhi has long per-
ceived Indonesia, the dominant state in archipelagic Southeast Asia, as being a linchpin 
of any strategy to constrain Chinese inﬂuence in Southeast Asia.40 Indonesia is by far 
the largest state in Southeast Asia and is regarded as primus inter pares in ASEAN. 
It represents a big market for Indian exports as well as a major supplier of resources. 
A close relationship with Indonesia would enhance India’s role in the region as well as 
helping India to develop its other relationships across Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s his-
torical concern about China also makes it a potentially important partner in balancing 
China’s economic, political, and strategic inﬂuence in East Asia. 
However engagement in the security dimension has so far been more symbolic than 
substantive. Since 2002, the Indian and Indonesian navies have undertaken biannual 
“coordinated” naval patrols in the Six-Degree Channel at the northern entrance to 
the Malacca Strait. Although token in practical terms, such joint action, particularly 
at the entrance of the Malacca Strait, has considerable symbolic value. A 2001 Defense 
Cooperation Agreement also provides for the supply by India of training and equipment 
and the development of the Indonesian defense industry. But there has been little real 
progress in this area, partly due to difﬁculties India faces in supplying jointly developed 
weapons (such as BrahMos cruise missiles)41 and residual sensitivities in India about 
Indonesia’s relationship with Pakistan. However, India’s Pipavav shipbuilder now has 
plans to build naval corvettes in Surabaya, which could also prompt greater cooper-
ation and between the Indian and Indonesian navies in the provision of training and 
technology. 
Indonesia’s leading role in Southeast Asia, together with its geographical position 
as gatekeeper between the Indian and Paciﬁc Oceans, might make it an indispens-
able regional partner for India. A broad-based defense partnership between India and 
Indonesia could transform India’s role in Southeast Asia. Yet, while bilateral trade is 
growing quickly, both India and Indonesia are subject to signiﬁcant internal constraints, 
which make any political or security engagement slow and hesitant. Among other 
things, Indonesia’s small defense budget creates practical difﬁculties for Indonesia’s 
armed forces. The development of a broad-based relationship with Indonesia would 
require a major political, economic, and security commitment by New Delhi that has 
so far not been forthcoming. 
India’s security relationships with Thailand and Malaysia are also evolving slowly. 
Thailand’s views about maritime security in the Indian Ocean are broadly convergent 
with India’s and Bangkok seems to accept India’s strategic aspirations in the north-
east Indian Ocean. But the security relationship is relatively undeveloped. Over the 
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last decade or so, India provided assistance to combat Islamic separatists in Southern 
Thailand in return for Thai authorities taking action against Indian separatists using 
Thailand as an arms supply route. Since 2006, the Indian and Thai navies have also 
conducted symbolic “coordinated patrols” in the Andaman Sea. An MOU on Defense 
Cooperation was signed in January 2012 and an annual Defense Dialogue has been 
established. However, closer security cooperation will likely be limited by Thailand’s 
political instability and its very limited naval capabilities in the Andaman Sea. 
Malaysia, through its political and economic inﬂuence and its geographical posi-
tion, is also important to India’s strategic ambitions in the region. Although India gave 
Malaya/Malaysia considerable diplomatic support in the 1950s and 60s, the relation-
ship became somewhat strained, particularly after Malaysia began emphasizing its ties 
with Muslim countries, including Pakistan. There are now several irritations in the rela-
tionship, including political unrest among the Indian ethnic community in Malaysia, 
unhappy with their economic and political marginalization.42 Malaysia’s links with 
China have also sometimes caused it to be cool about including India in East Asian 
regional groupings; Malaysia opposed holding a separate ASEAN-India summit and 
quietly supported China’s attempts to exclude India from the ﬁrst East Asian Summit 
in 2005. 
Malaysia has also been somewhat cautious about India’s strategic ambitions in the 
region. Malaysia has had concerns about the level of Chinese inﬂuence in Myanmar and 
the potential for a Chinese naval presence in the northeast Indian Ocean.43 But neither 
has Kuala Lumpur always been enthusiastic about India’s attempts to promote itself as 
the leading maritime security provider in the Andaman Sea and gain a role inside the 
Malacca Strait. Unlike some of its ASEAN neighbors, Malaysia considers that it has an 
active role to play in Indian Ocean security, as indicated by the deployment the Royal 
Malaysian Navy to the Gulf of Aden since 2008. Malaysia has declined to hold regular 
bilateral naval exercises or conduct “coordinated patrols” with the Indian Navy in the 
Andaman Sea in the nature of the patrols the Indian Navy conducts with Indonesia 
and Thailand. Although there is an MOU relating to defense cooperation, much of it 
remains unimplemented. 
However, there is increasing cooperation in respect of shared defense platforms. 
Since 2007, the Indian Air Force has provided training for the Malaysian Air Force’s 
Russian-built SU-30 MKM aircraft. There is also an agreement to cooperate in main-
tenance and training for the French-designed Scorpene submarines being deployed by 
the Malaysian and Indian navies, which could be signiﬁcant in terms of relationships 
and interoperability. Overall, the political and economic relationship seems to be on 
the upswing. It is possible that as economic links with India develop Kuala Lumpur 
will become more comfortable with an Indian security presence in its immediate area. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As its varied relationships in the region attest, there is no clear Indian defense strategy 
towards ASEAN. Rather, this article has sought to understand India’s regional relation-
ships in terms of two broad sets of strategic objectives. The ﬁrst set of objectives relate 
to the northeast Indian Ocean, including a perceived imperative to be the leading power 
in the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea. India also aspires to assume a direct security role 
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inside the Malacca Strait in cooperation with littoral states. A second set of strategic 
objectives stems from a more general aspiration to expand its strategic role in Southeast 
Asia and further into the Paciﬁc. This is partly to balance China, but also reﬂects a wish 
to expand India’s strategic space as it grows as a major regional power. 
While India promotes the centrality of ASEAN as a political and economic group-
ing, ASEAN’s weakness in coordinating regional security policy means that the 
substance of defense relationships is inevitably at the bilateral level. India has neither 
the inﬂuence nor strategic focus to encourage ASEAN states to engage with it in a 
coordinated manner. As a result, India’s defense relations with ASEAN states reﬂect 
their different strategic perspectives and different historical relationships with India. 
India has developed a close defense relationship with Singapore, which acts as its “hub” 
in the region. Elsewhere, India’s moves have been slow and hesitant. Some in New 
Delhi work with Vietnam to establish an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea, 
but India is likely to be cautious about taking any action that could lead to a possi-
ble confrontation with China. India also aspires to develop defense relationships with 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, but here again the rhetoric has often exceeded the 
reality. If India is to build a major strategic role in the region it will need to prove itself 
to be a useful partner to these key states. This will require a much greater and more 
consistent commitment to the entire region than has been evident over the last decade 
or so. 
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